Abstract-This study aims to examine the association between book-tax differences and audit fees in Indonesia. This study also examines the effect of corporate governance as a variable to moderate the association. The sample used is companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012 until 2016, which consist of 309 observations. The results indicate that book-tax differences have no significant effect on audit fees. Corporate governance is also not proven to weaken the association. Interpretation of the results might imply that book-tax differences have not been seen by auditors as a risk factor in determining the audit fees, probably due to the low potential of earnings management from such differences.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a company, there are two parties that play an important role in achieving its objectives, namely the owner and manager. The problem that usually happens is a conflict of interest that occurs because management often prioritizes its interests than the principal interests [1] . Management can do things that can be profitable for them. One example is to reduce costs as much as possible, including the tax burden, so that the company's earnings look great and good. This can be done using tax planning or avoidance in order to pay less tax to make the company's net income become higher.
There has been much research related to tax planning or avoidance. One common proxy used is the ratio between book profit (accounting) and profit by fiscal (tax) known as Book-Tax Difference (hereafter abbreviated to BTD) [2] . The difference between accounting profit and fiscal profit is due to differences in the standard used. Accounting profit is calculated based on accrual basis accounting standards, while fiscal profit is calculated based on taxation laws applicable on the basis of tax liability claims.
Palepu et al. [4] and Phillips et al. [5] indicate that BTD contains information about the opportunistic actions of management to achieve their interests as well as reflect the quality of profit which is directly proportional to earnings persistence. This is evidenced in [6] that explains that companies with large BTD have a lower persistence level of profit which is directly proportional to the quality of earnings. The decrease in earnings persistence will impact the information about how the company will generate profits in the following year. Therefore, the magnitude of BTD will lead to the information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders on the next year's earnings forecasts [7] . Thus, information asymmetry between managers and external stakeholders will increase [8] , [9] .
From an auditor's point of view, the low quality of a company's earnings may reflect the likelihood of managers presenting financial statements in order to achieve their personal interests, and this may cause the client's inherent risk to increase. Bedard and Johnstone argue that the auditor will increase the procedures, timing, and audit fees if a client is at risk of earnings manipulation [10] . In his research, Heltzer and Shelton conducted a large-scale auditor survey and found that the average auditor sees large BTD in addition to audit risks as an indication of earnings management [11] .
From the research that has been done before, it can be concluded that large BTD can increase the inherent risk and control risk which is directly proportional to the client's audit risk. Therefore, the auditor will add the scale and audit procedures, hence this will automatically increase the time and cost of the audit.
Research on the effect of BTD on time and cost of an audit has been done by [3] . The purpose of the study is to verify whether the auditor actually uses this information at the stage of the audit procedure. The result of this research is the association between BTD and audit time is not statistically significant. Furthermore, there is a significant positive influence between BTD and audit fees. From the results of this study, it can be concluded that the auditor will request additional audit fees caused by rising audit risk because of the higher BTD in a company reflecting the existence of manipulation or earnings management.
In his research, [3] also used corporate governance as a moderating variable. The reason why he used governance as a moderating variable is because of the positive and negative relationships (mixed results) between the effects of corporate governance on time-related and audit fees [3] . According to research that has been done previously in [12] and [13] , if a client has good corporate governance, the audit risk will be reduced because the internal control system and financial reporting have been established and done well. Automatically, the auditor's time and the cost of auditing will also be reduced. On the other hand, clients with good governance will prefer high audit quality to achieve better governance and maintain their reliability in the capital market. This leads to a high demand time and audit fees because the client wants a highquality audit. Therefore, [3] also want to prove whether clients who have good corporate governance can influence the relationship between BTD and audit time/cost. After conducting the research, it has been proved that there is a significant positive relationship between corporate governance and BTD relationship with audit cost.
The absence of similar research as [3] in public companies in Indonesia became the motivation to conduct this research. This study has some differences from [3] that serve as the research gap. First, [3] conducted research on public companies in South Korea which is one of the developed countries. Meanwhile, this research is conducted on public companies in Indonesia, which is a developing country. Companies in Indonesia still consider the selection of auditor based on the number of audit fees instead of the big name or quality of the public accounting firm (Gatot, 2010 in [14] ). This is due to the tight audit market conditions in Indonesia, which are not only dominated by the Big 4 firm. In addition to the study context, there are differences in the sampling period. Research [3] used the period from 2005 to 2011, while this study uses the period from 2012 to 2016. The sampling period of this study is expected to better reflect the current conditions. This research also did not include the audit timing variable in the study because previous research shows no significant association. Another reason is due to the difficulties in obtaining the data.
This research is expected to provide academic as well as practical contributions. For the academic side, the results of this research can contribute to the literature on the use of BTD as a proxy for audit risk and its association with the audit fees. For practical contributions, this research is expected to inform companies about the importance of corporate governance in mitigating illegal acts including tax avoidance or manipulation. Such information can also be used by investors in analyzing a company's risk to make investment decisions.
II. THEORETICAL REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

A. Agency Theory
The agency theory posits the relationship between the company's owner (principal) and the manager of the company (agent). As two different parties with the same goal, in which the principal as a provider of capital for companies and the agents as management that manages and runs the company's activities, of course, there is a conflict of interest between the two. On the one hand, the agent is authorized by the principal to run the business, but the agent also seeks to maximize the profits it will receive. Therefore, there is a conflict of interest between the principal and agent because the agent often prioritizes their interests first, then the principal's interests [1] .
In addition to the issue of conflict of interest, another problem that occurs between the principal and the agent is the presence of information asymmetry (Messier et al., 2006) . Information asymmetry is the imbalance or inequality of information owned by principals and agents. This argument is reinforced by [15] , stating that the agent does not always perform its activities in accordance with the interests of the principal. Therefore, the probability of information asymmetry between the two is increasingly arising due to a conflict of interest between the two. As an illustration, management tends to mask information that has a negative effect on the agency's interests so that information obtained by shareholders will be incomplete. On the other hand, shareholders want to get complete information from the financial statements in order to monitor and make decisions at a maximum. Accordingly, the shareholders appoint an external auditor annually to check whether the company's financial statements have been reasonably presented in order to prevent this information asymmetry problem.
The principal can do several things to overcome agency problems. Jensen and Meckling [1] in [15] states that there are three types of agency costs, among others: 1) monitoring cost, which is the cost of principal which aims to monitor and limit the behavior of opportunistic agents in managing the company such as audit cost; 2) bonding cost, i.e. the cost incurred by the agent to convince the principal that management acts on the wishes or interests of the principal. Examples are costs incurred for the preparation of financial statements audited by public accountants and reported to the principal; 3) residual loss, i.e. the loss borne by the principal because there is still a mismatch between the agent and the principal even though there has been monitoring and bonding costs.
The principal should be able to minimize the agency costs that arise to increase the value of the company. Efforts that should be made to reduce this agency cost is to perform corporate disclosure and use Good Corporate Governance (GCG) for companies with high levels of low transparency and hence will bear high agency costs (Randoy and Goel, 2003) .
B. Business Ethics Theory
According to [17] , business ethics is a business moral understanding between right and wrong which is applied to institutions, policies, and businesses. Business ethics, therefore, is an important factor that companies need when taking business decisions.
Business ethics is also an important factor in economic activity in Indonesia. The National Committee on Governance Policy [18] explains that business ethics is a reference for companies in carrying out business including in interacting with stakeholders. Business ethics is important because a company has an obligation to maintain its behavior and ethics towards all stakeholders and be able to convey good values to maintain the integrity and long-term relationships among business conduct [19] . Therefore, business ethics knowledge
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is essential for corporate governance and other stakeholders. In addition, ethics is also the most fundamental thing that could be the cause of the violations committed by employees or employees of the company. The intended violation is an act that violates the relevant industry legislation, regulations or standards, and company internal regulations [20] . In the book, The Seven Signs of Ethical Collapse: How to Spot Moral Meltdowns in Companies written by Marianne Jennings, seven causes of ethical problems within the company are explained, among others: [21] 1) Pressure to meet goals, especially for finance 2) Cultures that are not open and discussions are held in secret 3) The CEO is surrounded by people who agree with him 4) Boards are weak and do not do fiduciary responsibility 5) Organizations that promote people to nepotism 6) The arrogance that people will perceive rules and values is for other people, not for themselves 7) A false view is that unethical behavior in an area will be offset by ethical behavior in other areas. The act of manipulation or earnings management, which is reflected in the difference in accounting and fiscal profit (BTD), performed by the managers of the company so that the company's earnings look good and attract investors to invest, is a violation of ethics in business because the action is done for the personal interest of management and includes deceptive actions that would harm investors and other stakeholders.
C. Book-Tax Differences
Book-Tax Differences (BTD) is the difference in accounting profit with the fiscal profit that occurs due to differences between accounting rules and tax regulations in the recognition of revenues and expenses. The difference is caused by several things, namely differences in accounting principles, differences in accounting methods and procedures, and differences in revenue recognition and expenses.
The two types of BTD are permanent differences and temporary differences. The permanent difference is the difference between accounting profit and fiscal profit caused by the tax provisions and will not cause accounting problems and does not affect the future tax liability, which consists of income that has been deducted by final income tax, income which is not a tax object, and expenses incurred in nondeductible expenses (which cannot be excluded from income). Meanwhile, the temporary differences are differences between accounting income to taxable income due to tax provisions and impact in the future for a certain period so that the effect of the accounting income and taxable income eventually consist of the allowance/accrual and realization, depreciation, amortization, and compensation loss.
D. Audit Fees
Audit fees are fees paid by a client to a Public Accountant for the services of the independent auditor provided. The amount of audit fees may vary by client depending on the size of the risk, the complexity of the services required, the financing structure of the Public Accounting Firm (KAP-Kantor Akuntan Publik in Bahasa Indonesia), and other considerations. In determining the audit fee, KAP is not allowed to receive or request compensation for clients who can damage the reputation of a firm. That is, KAP must be able to act professionally in determining the audit fees. This is stated in the 
E. Development of Hypothesis
In accordance with the agency theory and business ethics theory that has been elaborated, there is a conflict of interest between the owner of the company as a provider of capital with the management as the run of the business. One of the management efforts to achieve personal interests is to reduce costs as much as possible in order to get more profit and to make financial statements will look good because the company is considered to have a good performance. One of the company costs that can be suppressed and avoided is the tax burden by means of tax planning or avoidance. The existence of such efforts may lead to large differences between the company's accounting profits and the tax profits that should be earned. Therefore, BTD reflects the information of an opportunist attitude of managers in the policy on accounting earnings or the quality of a company's earnings [4] [5] .
According to empirical evidence of previous research, there is an indication that if the BTD of a company is large, then the company's profit quality will be low and this is directly proportional to the reduced persistence of earnings to be generated in the next year [6] [22] . From the auditor's point of view, the low quality of a company's earnings (clients) can lead to the possibility that the manager presents the financial statements in order to achieve his personal interests and this may cause the client's default risk to increase. Therefore, a large BTD will increase the client's innate risk and control which is directly proportional to the audit risk. This is in accordance with [11] on surveys to auditors on a large scale that resulted in an average auditor assuming a link between all types of large BTD with increased audit risk. The higher the audit risk, the longer the audit procedure performed and
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hence the auditor will charge additional fees for additional audit procedures performed due to the high BTD of the client. In his research, [3] found that there is a significant positive relationship between large BTD and audit fees in South Korean state-owned companies listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). Based on [3] , then the hypothesis is proposed as follows: 1) H1: Book-tax difference has a positive effect on audit fees: To reduce agency costs caused by agency problems, one way that can be done is to disclose corporate information and the use of good corporate governance. The board of commissioners and audit committee are two important structures in corporate governance. The board of commissioners is responsible for overseeing the performance of the management and assisted by the audit committee who is responsible for the fairness and compliance of financial statement presentation and assisting the auditor in maintaining its independence from management [18] . In other words, when it comes to agency theory, the board of commissioners and the audit committee have an important role to play in reducing agency problems.
Characteristics of corporate governance also greatly affect audit risk [13] , which in turn will affect the amount of audit fees charged by the auditor to his clients. From the auditor side, if the client has good corporate governance, then the auditor will reduce audit risk and will reduce audit procedures because the client also has a good internal control system, and vice versa. In [10] is revealed that when the auditor makes an audit contract and prepares an audit plan for a company at risk of profit manipulation, the auditor will add audit procedures and their costs. The risk of profit manipulation indicates that the company has poor governance. It can be concluded that the existence of good governance will reduce audit risk, in which one of them is the risk of profit manipulation arising from the difference of accounting profit and fiscal profit so that there is no additional audit cost because of the risks.
A study on the effects of corporate governance on the impact of BTD on audit fees on publicly traded companies in South Korea shows significantly positive results [3] . It shows that the better corporate governance, companies tend to be willing to pay higher audit fees as a signal that the company is in good condition by paying external auditors to perform more complex audit procedures in order to produce more credible financial statements and maintain the reliability of the company in the market. Based on the results of previous research, the authors establish the following hypothesis:
2) H2: Good corporate governance can weaken the influence of book-tax differences on audit fees:
III. RESEARCH METHODS
A. Research Model
The model used to test the two hypotheses in this study refers to the journal Oh et al. (2016) by modifying some variables due to data limitations. Panel data is used with model 1 to test hypothesis 1 (the influence of book-tax difference on audit fees at companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange) and model 2 to test hypothesis 2 that is the moderating effect of corporate governance. The research model is described as follows:
Here is the description of the variables: The ratio of growth on one-year sales for firm i in year t-1 (t) CON Control Dummy, 1 if the company reports consolidated financial statements and 0 otherwise INVREC Control The sum of inventories and receivables is divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1 (t) ROA Control Profit before tax divided by total assets for company i in year t-1 (t)
B. Sample Selection Method
The research sample is selected by using purposive/judgment sampling methods using certain predetermined criteria in order to get the right result to prove the hypothesis that has been given. The criteria referred to in the purposive/judgment sampling are: 1) Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and publish annual reports and annual financial reports in full since 2012-2016 2) The company that has a fiscal year ending December 31 3) Companies disclosing information about audit fees or audit fees in their annual report in 2012-2016 4) A company which is not a specially regulated company in taxation, that is, a company subject to Final Income Tax (construction, real estate, and land and/or building
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rental services) and a company which is allowed to form and own reserve fund by taxation finance, mining, and agriculture 5) Companies that suffered losses during the study period were excluded from the research sample because the company that suffered losses did not pay taxes.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. The result of sample selection
The population used in this study are companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) except companies engaged in the finance, construction and real estate, mining, and agriculture industries (due to special tax rules) in the period 2012-2016. The method of selecting the sample is purposive/judgment sampling with previously described criteria. The type of sample used in this study is unbalanced sampling so that many companies can be included as samples compared to balanced sampling techniques (as not all firms disclose audit fees annually). Table 2 is a summary of the sample selection process used in this study. 
B. Descriptive Statistical Analysis
The purpose of the descriptive statistics analysis is to analyze the characteristics, relevance, and dissemination of the data used in the study. Descriptive statistics are done by looking at the average value, standard deviation, the lowest value, and the highest value of each research variable. The following table show the descriptive statistical results of this study: The audit fee variable is the dependent variable using the natural logarithm of the audit fee paid by the client. Rp 14, 967 billion. This amount is the winsorizing results because the nominal audit fees from the three companies are the outlier compare to the nominal audit fees of the entire observation sample. The standard deviation of audit fees in the natural form of logarithms is 1.1833. Compared to the average audit fee value which is also a natural logarithm of 20.5221, the standard deviation is smaller than the average value. This shows that the distribution of the audit fee is concentrated around the average.
The BTD variable is an independent variable measured by the ratio of the absolute value of the difference in accounting profit to tax income divided by total assets. The minimum value of the BTD variable is owned by PT Kobexindo Tractors Tbk in 2012 and the maximum value after winsorizing is owned by PT Bali Towerindo Sentra Tbk (2016), PT Sepatu Bata Tbk (2015), PT Pelayaran Nelly Dwi Putri Tbk (2012), PT Mandom Indonesia Tbk (2015), PT Pelayaran Tempuran Mas Tbk (2014), and PT Sarana Merana Nusantara Tbk (2015). The average value of this variable is 0.0222 and the standard deviation is 0.0214. Comparison of the average value and standard deviation of this variable is not too far, so it can be concluded that the data is scattered and varied.
The GOV variable is a moderating variable measured by the manual scoring of the quality of corporate governance mechanisms related to audit fees, namely the board of commissioners and audit committee. This corporate governance scoring refers to the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard as the disclosure index. The minimum value of the GOV variable is owned by PT Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk in 2012 and the maximum value is owned by PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk in 2016. PT Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk has the lowest corporate governance score which means that the company has not disclosed complete governance information in its annual report. The average value of this variable is 0.5549 and the standard deviation is 0.1257, which shows that the data is concentrated around the average.
C. Pearson Correlation Test
Pearson Correlation testing performed in this research is summarized in table 4. Based on the table, variables that have a positive correlation with the audit fees are GOV, BTDGOV, BIG4, SIZE, CON, and ROA, which means those variables have a positive relationship with audit fees, while other variables do not significantly affect audit fees.
D. Regression Test Result
The results from regression model 1 in Table 5 shows that the Book-Tax Differences (BTD) variable has a positive relationship but does not significantly affect the audit cost (LNAF) when viewed from its coefficient and probability value. This indicates that BTD is not too much of an auditor's consideration as audit risk. According to a study conducted by Sismi (2013) on the effect of BTD on earnings persistence on companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, the BTD component in the normal characteristics, i.e. the difference in accounting profit with fiscal profit, is not proven to reduce the profit persistence. This might be because BTD in the sample has normal characteristics as a reasonable component that occurs from the different provisions of accounting and taxation. It also indicates that the normal characteristic of BTD does not necessarily reflect the company's earnings management activities. The earnings management activity is more reflected by the abnormal BTD. The measurement of BTD conducted in this study is to calculate the difference in accounting profit with fiscal profit. Therefore, the risk of audit caused by BTD in this study might indicate low indication of manipulation or earnings management.
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The regression result of model 2 also shows that good corporate governance (GOV) does not weaken the influence of book-tax differences (BTD) on the audit fees (LNAF). This is supported by previous research conducted by [25] on factors that may affect the audit costing that the auditor in determining the audit cost has not considered the client's managed governance as evidenced by the results of the research which show insignificant results. Auditors still see in terms of firm size, KAP size, and client complexity as factors affecting audit fees.
